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 DTSA: A Federal Tort of Unfair 
Competition in Aerial Reconnaissance, 
Broken Deals, and Employment 
         Stephen Y. 
Chow* 
Abstract 
This Essay critiques the creation by the 114th Congress of a 
federal private right of action under the Defend Trade Secrets Act 
for the state unfair competition cause of trade secret 
misappropriation hitherto applied mostly to breaches of express or 
implied confidential relationships between businesses or with 
employees.  The proposed insertion of the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act definition of “misappropriation,” including acquisition by 
“improper means” exemplified by state commercial mores’ 
expectation of privacy from aerial reconnaissance, into the 
Economic Espionage Act framework of theft of a more narrowly 
defined “trade secret” of a defined “owner,” including such actions 
abroad by American companies, opens litigation opportunities 
that are unlikely to fulfill the purposes of the legislation.  There is 
no current need to “harmonize” compliance programs, and the 
non-preemptive legislation would simply add more issues to be 
litigated in multiple contexts, including disputes over privacy or 
confidentiality managed by online terms.  The legislation’s 
limitation of injunctions under a promise of “employee mobility” 
threatens state practices of contractual restrictions on post-
employment competition. 
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I. Introduction 
The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (“DTSA”)1 would create 
a federal private right of action under the Economic Espionage 
Act (“EEA”)2 for the state unfair competition tort of 
“misappropriation,” which is defined under the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act (“UTSA”) to include acquisition of competitively 
valuable information by “improper means” or use in breach of a 
contractual or other duty “to maintain its secrecy or limit its 
use.”3  
                                                                                                     
 1. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 3326 & S. 1890, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
 2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012). 
 3. The UTSA was promulgated in 1979 and revised in 1985 by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Unif. Trade 
Secrets Act (1985), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf. It 
has been adopted in forty-seven states, Legislative Fact Sheet—Trade Secrets 
Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N (2015), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2015) [hereinafter UTSA] (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review), and adopted in substance in North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 
66-152–66-157 (2015). 
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Over the nearly two centuries of using this branch of state 
unfair competition law,4 the overwhelming portion of cases have 
involved unauthorized use of information lawfully acquired in 
broken business deals and by employees who leave and compete.5 
The only paradigm for non-fraudulent, non-trespassory “improper 
means” remains aerial reconnaissance as against “commercial 
morality.”6 The current proliferation of aerial drones with 
cameras may see challenges through UTSA or DTSA actions, if 
not by self-help. 
The DTSA’s sponsors justify their departure from tort reform 
with the need to combat alleged theft of American trade secrets, 
valued at twelve figures annually, including theft through foreign 
cyber-espionage and theft of the embodiments of trade secrets 
such as trespass to steal experimental seeds.7 This Essay 
questions whether the DTSA’s contribution to solving these 
problems8 is outweighed by clear societal costs9—including those 
                                                                                                     
 4. See Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523, 525 (1837) (regarding a restrictive 
covenant on the secret art of making chocolate); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS 
§§ 757–759 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (addressing trade secrets); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (addressing 
trade secrets). 
 5. See David S. Almeling, et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret 
Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 60–61 (2010) (“[T]he alleged 
misappropriator was an employee or a business partner 93% of the time in this 
state study. That figure was comparable to that of the federal study, which 
showed the alleged misappropriator to be an employee or a business partner in 
90% of cases.”). 
 6. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475–76 (1974) (citing E. 
I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
Aerial reconnaissance is also discussed as an example of possibly improper 
means in the UTSA. UTSA, supra note 3, § 1 cmt. 
 7. See 161 CONG. REC. S7250–51 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) (discussing the impact of trade secret theft). 
 8. Cyber-theft typically is perpetrated by depositing malware through 
“spearphishing”—tricking insiders to open malware files through believable 
emails (such as apparently from a trusted person). Other than apprehending the 
sender (which DTSA does not provide for, but existing EEA does) the solutions 
include insider discipline as to secure practices, malware detection, and 
restriction of internal access, which are not subjects of DTSA. Other foreign 
agent theft is already addressed by existing EEA and fits within diversity 
federal diversity jurisdiction. “Stings” or “entrapment” of suspect insiders are 
available under existing EEA, but not under UTSA or DTSA. 
 9. Proponents have identified a swing from patent disclosure to trade 
secret non-disclosure (as was prevalent in the 1970s, see UTSA, supra note 3, at 
Prefatory Note), because of the elimination of the “best mode” requirement for 
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of American businesses—in establishment of a not-quite-parallel-
to-UTSA federal tort of unfair competition applied in practice 
mostly to broken deals and exiting employees. 
The DTSA may backfire by enabling—through its minimal 
jurisdictional requirements10—and incentivizing11 suits by non-
practicing entities12 and foreign entities for breaches of foreign 
duties.13 Even if it does not, by failing to preempt state trade 
                                                                                                     
patents, the limitation of the effect of “secret use” on patentability, and the 
expansion of prior use rights by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). Such “siloing” of knowledge arguably led to the 
downfall of the mini-computer giants of 1980s Massachusetts. 
 10. DTSA § 2 creates a new 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) cause for an “owner of a 
trade secret,” defined at existing §§ 1839(3)–(4), “who is aggrieved by a [UTSA] 
misappropriation of a trade secret that is related to a product or service used in, 
or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” Defend Trade Secrets Act 
of 2015, H.R. 3326 & S. 1890, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015) (emphasis added). This 
is considerably broader than the “theft of trade secrets” offense of EEA that 
requires an “intent to convert . . . to the economic benefit of anyone other than 
the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will injure any 
owner of that trade secret” and knowing theft, transmission, receipt, attempt, or 
conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012) (emphasis added). There is no jurisdictional 
amount required, as in diversity jurisdiction, or by many state courts of general 
jurisdiction. See H.R. 3326 & S. 1890 § 2 (addressing federal jurisdiction for 
theft of trade secrets). 
 11. Overlooking the UTSA § 3 Comment that the section authorizes double 
exemplary damages in addition to actual recovery, DTSA on its face authorizes 
triple exemplary damages. H.R. 3326 & S. 1890 § 2(a) (providing for triple 
damages under proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(C)). DTSA allows the trade 
secret plaintiff to wait five years to sue while the defendant develops a market 
and collects revenues—two more years than UTSA § 6. See id. § 2(d) (providing 
the period of limitations). 
 12. This is the broad definition of “troll” for a patent, ownership of which by 
itself does not merit, since eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), 
an injunction against further infringement unless there is irreparable injury 
threatened, for example, to the good will of an owner that practices the patented 
invention. Under the UTSA, injunction against use of a “secret” may be enjoined 
as irreparable “disclosure” (typically in violation of a non-disclosure agreement) 
even if the plaintiff does not use the “secret.” Some proponents of the DTSA 
dismiss application of the much narrower “troll” business model of “holding up” 
multiple defendants because UTSA misappropriation is an intentional tort 
unlike the strict liability infringement of patents, that is, trade secrets are not 
“property” like patents (even weakened by eBay). 
 13. Existing 18 U.S.C. § 1837 expressly allows application of “the chapter” 
to conduct occurring outside the United States if “the offender is a natural 
person who is a citizen or permanent resident alien of the United States, or an 
organization organized under the laws of the United States or a State or 
political subdivision thereof . . . .” DTSA places in the chapter a private right of 
action for UTSA misappropriation—including acquisition by “improper means” 
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secret misappropriation law and setting up a not-quite-parallel 
federal regime, DTSA exposes significant issues to be litigated in 
both regimes. Such litigation not only increases the cost of 
protecting trade secrets, but may narrow the adopted EEA “trade 
secret” definition in ways not previously challenged by criminal 
defense lawyers who represented individuals with limited 
resources.  
Litigation over these issues may affect the law of business 
and employment relationships involved in most trade secret 
cases, including concepts of express and implied consent, 
contracts, and expectations of privacy. Indeed, the DTSA 
sponsors expressly recorded in the legislative history its policy of 
“employee mobility,” that the DTSA “states explicitly that a 
person cannot be prevented from accepting an offer of 
employment because of his or her prior exposure to trade 
secrets.”14 As discussed below, if this language survives through 
enactment, there is much to argue as to its effects, if any, on 
employee non-compete agreements, a mainstay of non-
Californian American business. 
Many of these issues stem from the mismatch of the UTSA 
codification of the unfair competition of use of information in 
breach of a duty “to maintain its secrecy or limit its use” or 
acquired by “improper means” with the more narrowly targeted 
EEA criminal theft or conversion of a “trade secret.” 
II. UTSA “Misappropriation” Is Unfair Competition in Use of 
Open-Ended “Trade Secrets” 
A wide range of conduct has been called “misappropriation,” 
such as copying products or “free-riding” on another’s 
achievements in the market. Misappropriation is also called 
“unfair competition” by some aggrieved parties. 
Congress has not granted a federal private right of action for 
general unfair competition as, for example, addressed under the 
                                                                                                     
viewed against commercial morality and duties attached to relationships to 
maintain secrecy or limit use. See H.R. 3326 & S. 1890 § 2 (defining 
“misappropriation” and “improper means”). 
 14. 161 CONG. REC. S7252 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch). 
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Federal Trade Commission Act.15 It has acted under the 
Commerce Clause to create (1) a federal private right of action 
under the Lanham Act for unfair competition in misappropriation 
of commercial identity—originally, and still primarily, of 
federally registered trademarks16; and (2) a federal private right 
of action under the Copyright Act for misappropriation of 
unpublished works previously protected under state law.17 
Unfair competition through trade secret misappropriation 
involves many more legal issues than are raised by copying a 
trademark that the public has associated with a source or an 
unpublished manuscript. In the earliest American cases, “trade 
secrets” were defined as the knowledge of someone who acquired 
it lawfully in commerce, including employment, but who was 
bound by some “confidential” relationship to limit its use and 
disclosure.18 The wrong occurred in the breach of that duty of 
confidentiality. If the duty was created by contract, the wrong 
would be a breach of contract. If it was created by a recognized 
fiduciary, confidential, or agency relationship, the wrong would 
                                                                                                     
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). In contrast many states have “Baby FTC Acts” 
that do grant such private rights of action, often used against trade secret 
misappropriation. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 2 & 11 (West 2015). 
 16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114–1129 (2012). DTSA proponents cite the coexistence of 
the Lanham Act and state unfair competition (trademark) law to support the 
creation of a dual system of civil trade secret misappropriation law. The analogy 
is inapt because of the much greater interaction of the UTSA with different 
bodies of state law as outlined in this Essay and the particularly open-ended 
UTSA “trade secret.” The DTSA’s adaptation of the Lanham Act provision for 
specified time and space civil seizure of counterfeits of federally registered 
trademarks (and not merely unauthorized distribution), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(d), is 
hardly applicable to ideas in a person’s memory. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 
2015, H.R. 3326 & S. 1890, 114th Cong., § 2(a) (2015) (providing requirements of 
civil seizure). 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (preempting state law). The Commerce 
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, was a back-up argument for the change 
from pre-1976 publish-with-notice-for-limited-monopoly as the quid pro quo 
under the Patent and Copyright Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. Some have 
suggested the AIA’s cut-back on disclosure also challenges that quid pro quo. 
 18. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 461–62 (Mass. 1868) (regarding 
confidential employment and “secrets of trade”); Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523, 
525 (1837) (regarding trade secrets following the sale of a chocolate factory); 
Peter Andreas, Piracy and Fraud Propelled the U.S. Industrial Revolution, 
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-
02-01/piracy-and-fraud-propelled-the-u-s-industrial-revolution (last visited Oct. 
19, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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be a breach of that duty. What trade secret misappropriation law 
added was recognition of non-contractual, non-fiduciary duties 
arising in business negotiations and sales, which overlap fraud-
type “improper means” of acquisition.19 
In cataloguing its torts, the 1939 Restatement expressly 
rejected a “property” theory of entitlement: “The suggestion that 
one has a right to exclude others from the use of his trade secret 
because he has a right of property in the idea has been frequently 
advanced and rejected.”20 
State causes of action for “misappropriation” by copying 
publicly available product design were found to have been 
preempted by federal patent law in the 1964 case Sears, Roebuck 
& Co. v. Stiffel Co.21 In 1974, the Supreme Court in Kewanee v. 
Bicron22 cleared from such preemption the following types of 
trade secret “misappropriation”: 
The protection accorded the trade secret holder is against the 
disclosure or unauthorized use of the trade secret by those to 
whom the secret has been confided under the express or 
implied restriction of nondisclosure or nonuse. The law also 
protects the holder of a trade secret against disclosure or use 
when the knowledge is gained, not by the owner’s volition, but 
by some “improper means,” Restatement of Torts § 757(a), 
which may include theft, wiretapping, or even aerial 
reconnaissance.23 
The 1939 Restatement described “improper means of 
discovery” as those that “fall below the generally accepted 
standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct.”24 The 
                                                                                                     
 19. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) 
(addressing improper means and also acquisition by mistake). Section 758 
restates rules for innocent acquisition. Section 759 restates a cause for 
procurement by “improper means” of business information not rising to the level 
of 1939 RESTATEMENT’s “trade secrets” as defined in comment b to section 757. 
 20. Id. § 757 cmt. a. 
 21. 376 U.S. 225, 230–31 (1964) (“[T]he patent system is one in which 
uniform federal standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the 
same time preserving free competition.”). 
 22. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 23. Id. at 475–76. 
 24. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1939) 
(including as examples acquisition by physical force, “fraudulent 
misrepresentations to induce disclosure, tapping of telephone wires, 
eavesdropping or other espionage”); see also id. § 759 cmt. c 
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Kewanee Court added the aerial reconnaissance example of E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher,25 explaining: “The 
maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the 
encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies behind 
trade secret law. ‘The necessity of good faith and honest fair 
dealing, is the very life and spirit of the commercial world.’”26 The 
Christopher court reasoned: 
The Supreme Court of [Texas] has declared that “the 
undoubted tendency of the law has been to recognize and 
enforce higher standards of commercial morality in the 
business world.” . . . To obtain knowledge of a process without 
spending the time and money to discover it independently is 
improper unless the holder voluntarily discloses it or fails to 
take reasonable precautions to ensure its secrecy. . . . Perhaps 
ordinary fences and roofs must be built to shut out incursive 
eyes, but we need not require the discoverer of a trade secret 
to guard against the unanticipated, the undetectable, or the 
unpreventable methods of espionage now available.27 
State support of an expectation of respect of reasonable 
precautions against information-gathering without fraud or 
physical trespass may be considered recognition of commercial 
privacy.28 
The 1979 UTSA greatly expanded the 1939 Restatement’s 
definition of a “trade secret,” which was defined as “a process or 
                                                                                                     
Among the means which are improper are theft, trespass, bribing or 
otherwise inducing employees or others to reveal the information in 
breach of duty, fraudulent misrepresentations, threats of harm by 
unlawful conduct, wire tapping, procuring one’s own employees or 
agents to become employees of the other for purposes of 
espionage . . . . 
 25. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 26. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481–82 (citation omitted). 
 27. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1015–16. 
 28. Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (“A 
person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another’s interest in not 
having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable 
to the other.”), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625B (AM. LAW INST. 
1977) (“One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the 
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.”), with RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
§ 7.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (providing the employee’s expectation of privacy in 
physical and electronic spaces). 
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device for continuous use in the operation of the business.”29 The 
UTSA provides that: 
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, 
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or 
process, that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.30 
“The broader definition . . . extends protection to a plaintiff who 
has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means to put a 
trade secret to use.”31 The UTSA makes clear that it applies to 
any “information” that meets the stated qualifications.32 
As in the 1939 Restatement, the UTSA is not based on a 
property theory of entitlement: “The Uniform Act codifies the 
basic principles of common law trade secret protection, preserving 
its essential distinctions from patent law. Under both the Act and 
common law principles, for example, more than one person can be 
entitled to trade secret protection with respect to the same 
information . . . .”33 
Unlike a patent published with its claims (metes and bounds) 
and ownership registered with the U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, “trade secrets” are amorphous—dependent on situational 
                                                                                                     
 29. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939) 
(defining “trade secret”).  
 30. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (1985) (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. § 1 cmt. 
 32. Notably these do not include the fifth of the six factors listed in 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (“[T]he amount 
of effort or money expended by him in developing the information.”). 
 33. Unif. Trade Secrets Act, Prefatory Note (1985). Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) found in a “taking” analysis a “property 
interest” in documents submitted to the government designated “trade secret.” 
“Fee simple” ownership, however, has been rejected as a Maryland UTSA 
requisite. DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 
2001) (“[C]onceptual difficulty arises from any assumption that knowledge can 
be owned as property.”). Accord Advanced Fluid Systems, Inc. v. Huber, 28 F. 
Supp. 3d 306, 318–23 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (providing the same for Pennsylvania’s 
UTSA). 
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value and effort to keep secret—particularly UTSA “trade 
secrets” that may be ideas held in the minds of several people. 
The UTSA does not define an “owner,” but creates a tort remedy 
for acquisition by “improper means” or unauthorized use in 
breach of a confidential relationship—where entitlement of the 
plaintiff is based on the liability of the tortfeasor. 
The 1995 Restatement of Unfair Competition embraced the 
principles of the UTSA, noting that, “[m]any cases acknowledge 
that the primary issue is the propriety of the defendant’s conduct 
as a means of competition” and that 
[t]he definition of a trade secret contained in this Section 
[consistent with the UTSA] . . . is directly applicable only to 
the imposition of civil liability under the rules stated in § 40. It 
does not apply, other than by analogy, in actions under 
criminal statutes or in other circumstances not involving civil 
liability for the appropriation of a trade secret . . . . 34 
III. EEA Is Directed to “Theft” or “Conversion” of Narrower, 
“Owned” Manifestations 
Contrary to the 1995 Restatement’s caution, the EEA 
criminal statute was enacted the following year by the 104th 
Congress as a combination of H.R. 3723 and S. 1556 with a 
definition of “trade secret” similar to that of UTSA § 1(4) but 
shown here to be much narrower: 
H.R. 3723, the Economic Espionage Act of l996, creates a new 
crime of wrongfully copying or otherwise controlling trade 
secrets, if done with the intent either to (1) benefit a foreign 
government, instrumentality, or agent, or (2) disadvantage the 
rightful owner of the trade secret and for the purpose of 
benefitting another person. . . .35 
S. 1556, addressed to “proprietary economic information,” 
specifically protected employees: 
The bill explicitly states that the term proprietary economic 
information does not include the general knowledge, skills or 
                                                                                                     
 34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 1995) (“The concept of a trade secret as defined in this Section is intended 
to be consistent with the definition of ‘trade secret’ in § 1(4) of the [UTSA].”). 
 35. H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 3 (1996) (emphasis added). 
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experience that a person has. A prosecution under this statute 
must establish a particular piece of information that a person 
has stolen or misappropriated. It is not enough to say that a 
person has accumulated experience and knowledge during the 
course of his or her employ. Nor can a person be prosecuted on 
the basis of an assertion that he or she was exposed to 
proprietary economic information while employed. . . . 
 . . . . 
“Proprietary economic information” is defined as a type of 
intellectual property connoted by four characteristics: (1) it is 
proprietary; (2) its nature is economic, business, scientific, 
technical, or engineering; (3) it consists of information, data, 
plans, tools, mechanisms, compounds, formulas, designs, 
prototypes, processes, procedures, programs, codes, or 
commercial strategies; and (4) it derives value from its 
exclusivity. These features distinguish it from other forms of 
intellectual property, such as literary or artistic works. [It] 
also does not include general knowledge, experience, training, 
or skill acquired by a person as a result of his or her 
employment or hire by any owner.36 
The EEA adopted a definition of “trade secrets” that did not 
include the definition of “commercial strategies” that was 
included in the otherwise similar S. 1556 and definition of 
“proprietary economic information”:37 
(3) the term “trade secret” means all forms and types of 
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or 
engineering information, including patterns, plans, 
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, 
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or 
codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how 
stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, 
graphically, photographically, or in writing if— 
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep 
such information secret; and 
(B) the information derives independent economic value, 
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
                                                                                                     
 36. S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 12–14 (1996). 
 37. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012), with H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 2 , 
and S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 2. 
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being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the 
public . . . .38 
Despite explanations in the reports that the EEA “trade 
secret” definition is based on the UTSA,39 the language is 
substantively different. In a case of “more is less,” the longer list 
of examples and characterizations, combined with the narrow 
reading to be given terms in a criminal statute, as well as usage 
within EEA to support its objective of punishing “theft” and 
“conversion,” particularly with the additional express (if vague) 
definition of ownership, EEA “trade secrets” are very arguably a 
subclass of UTSA “trade secrets” that do not include mentally 
held “knowledge, skills and experience.” 
The UTSA uses open-ended “including” examples for 
unrestricted “information”; EEA uses “including” examples for 
express categories of information, omitting categories such as 
“cultural,” “literary,” and “strategic.” The language quoted from 
the Senate Report ruled out “literary or artistic” categories. 
The EEA characterizes its examples as being “stored, 
compiled, or memorialized”—not learned, known, or 
remembered—“physically, electronically, graphically, 
photographically, or in writing”—not mentally as the ideas 
protected by the UTSA as recognized in the 1995 Restatement.40 
The base EEA §§ 1831 and 1832 offenses of “theft” and 
“conversion” apply most clearly to physical objects or records, 
including “electronic” (which was considered during the 1990s to 
be “intangible”)—rather than mental knowledge. “Conversion” 
(intent required by both sections) is wrongful control over 
chattels, including documents into which “intangible rights are 
merged,” such as motion picture film.41 In accordance with the 
purpose of the EEA quoted above, the government is “required to 
                                                                                                     
 38. § 1839(3). 
 39. S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 14; H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 12. 
 40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 1995). See also id. cmt. d (“The appropriation of an idea offered to another 
through an oral presentation . . . can be actionable under the law of trade 
secrets.”). 
 41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 222A(1) & 242 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 1965). 
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prove that the defendant has wrongfully copied or otherwise 
exerted control over [that is, converted] a ‘trade secret.’”42  
EEA § 1832 theft expressly refers to the “owner,” and the 
EEA defines owner as “the person or entity in whom or in which 
rightful legal or equitable title to, or license in, the trade secret is 
reposed.”43 The UTSA does not define ownership. EEA’s reference 
to “rightful legal or equitable title” has unclear application to 
trade secrets that, unlike real property, patents, copyrights or 
statutory trademarks, are registered and provide notice of their 
scope.44 The alternative of “license” is even less clear, as licenses 
are presumed to be non-exclusive. Even exclusive licensees may 
not have standing to sue under other intellectual property law. 
The EEA concept of ownership fits with its concern over theft and 
conversion of physical (including electronic) manifestations of 
trade secrets and not with “knowledge, skills and experiences,” at 
least the “general” ones excluded by the Senate Report.45 
If disputed, the EEA definition of “trade secret” will be 
strictly construed as a part of a criminal statute.46 Deep-pocketed 
parties may argue one or more of the above in a DTSA suit—and 
by winning may also limit future prosecution under the criminal 
provisions of the EEA. 
IV. There Is No Present Need to Have Multiple Trade Secret 
Compliance Plans 
                                                                                                     
 42. H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 7 (1996). 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(4) (2012). 
 44. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939) 
(including notice as a factor). 
 45. S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 12–13 (1996). The elimination of the 
“commercial strategies” example is consistent with the exclusion of mental 
knowledge, rather than documents and other chattel manifesting secrets. See 
supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting the EEA’s exclusion of 
“commercial strategies”). 
 46. United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(construing the original EEA jurisdictional “produced for . . . interstate or 
foreign commerce” definition strictly (citing Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 
207, 213 (1985))); cf. WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 
204 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act “rule of lenity” 
in civil action). 
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Notwithstanding the arguably narrower applicability of EEA 
“trade secrets,” it simply is not true, as DTSA proponents stated 
for the 2014 predecessor bill, that the state enactments of the 
UTSA “require companies to tailor costly compliance plans to 
meet each individual state’s law.”47 Under the EEA, the UTSA, 
and the 1939 Restatement, only one compliance plan is required: 
one must do what is “reasonable” to keep the information sought 
to be protected “secret.”48 
The relatively few enforcement differences between 
particular UTSA enactments do not affect what can and should 
be done to protect information intended to be protected by the 
USTA or EEA definitions of “misappropriation” or “theft.” 
Variations by six states and the EEA of the UTSA § 1(4)(i) 
qualification of “not being generally known to, and not being 
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use”49 also do not 
                                                                                                     
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 113-657, at 7 (2014). Nor is enactment of the DTSA 
necessary to establish a “single national baseline” of “minimum protection,” as 
now suggested by the sponsors for its harmonization without preemption. See 
161 CONG. REC. S7251 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2015) (statement of Sen. Coons). It 
already exists. 
 48. The EEA requires “reasonable measures to keep such information 
secret.” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2012). UTSA § 1(4)(ii) requires “efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain [the protected information’s] 
secrecy.” Among the UTSA states, only Colorado requires “measures to prevent 
the secret from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the 
owner to have access thereto for limited purposes,” COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-
102(4) (2015), but the same baseline of “reasonable efforts” or “reasonable 
measures” would appear to meet this requirement. A New York intermediate 
appellate court (one of the two non-UTSA states) has cited the 1995 Restatement 
that adopted the UTSA definition with approval. E.g. Wiener v. Lazard Freres & 
Co., 241 A.D.2d 114, 124, 672 N.Y.S.2d 8, 15 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). The other 
non-UTSA state, Massachusetts, has adopted the 1939 Restatement. See J.T. 
Healy & Son v. James A. Murphy & Son, 260 N.E.2d 723, 738 (1970) (“But if the 
person entitled to a trade secret wishes to have its exclusive use in his own 
business, he must not fail to take all proper and reasonable steps to keep it 
secret.”). The 1939 Restatement includes a requirement of “a substantial 
element of secrecy,” measured by factors including “the extent of measures 
taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
 49. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1) (Deering 2015) (“[N]ot being generally 
known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use.”); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/2(d)(1) (2015) (“[N]ot being 
generally known to other persons who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-502 (2015) (“[N]ot being known to, and 
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affect what can and should be done to protect secrets. Whether a 
purported secret is “generally known to” or “readily ascertainable 
by” an undefined “public” as in the EEA or a relevant public as 
specified by the UTSA, that knowledge is outside the control of a 
compliance plan. 
Issues arise not from the different emphases of UTSA 
variants, but from non-disclosure agreements that cast a wide net 
without providing meaningful notice, unaccompanied by other 
efforts to ensure security of valuable information. Often 
obligations sunset for the convenience of business associates. 
Instead of preventing unfair competition by targeting 
unauthorized use of specific information, employers use the less 
expensive, blunt instrument of prohibiting post-employment 
competition altogether for a time that is related less to the “shelf 
life” of the information than to the ability of most employees to 
forego employment doing what they have gained experience 
doing. 
V. DTSA Is “Not Ready for Prime Time” 
A. Any Federal Cause of Action for Unfair Competition Should Be 
Better Studied Before Implementation 
Congress has been circumspect about creating federal private 
rights of action for unfair competition and should remain so. A 
federal cause of action for unfair competition based on terms such 
as the DTSA’s “improper means,” “consent,” and “duty to 
maintain secrecy or to limit use,” if it succeeds in opening federal 
courts to a significant number who cannot avail now (assuming 
these exist), will result in more frequent and perhaps more 
                                                                                                     
not being ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3)(a) 
(2015) (“[N]ot being generally known or readily ascertainable through 
independent development or reverse engineering by persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.461(4)(a) 
(2015) (“[N]ot being generally known to the public or to other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-
20(5)(a)(i) (2014) (“[N]ot being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by the public or any other person who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use.”). 
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rigorous federal litigation of these terms, rather than state court 
litigation. 
If it does not preempt the same UTSA terms, this likely 
would lead to greater disharmony, rather than the promised 
harmony. Even if not expressly preemptive, federal courts are 
likely to establish new constructions of UTSA or DTSA terms and 
may de facto preempt the more conservative operation of the 
“laboratories of democracy”—particularly because there is no 
DTSA counterpart to the UTSA § 8 deference to uniform 
development by the states. 
With the rapid expansion of uses for inexpensive aerial 
drones, including surveillance, one expects that the Christopher 
precedent for aerial reconnaissance as “improper means” will be 
applied early—and perhaps often. Compared to a UTSA action, 
federal DTSA action may better withstand a preemption 
challenge under federal regulations that might be put in place, 
for example, by the Federal Aviation Administration.50 
Concurrent or separate decisions on DTSA “improper 
means,” “consent,” and “duty to maintain secrecy or to limit use” 
may affect the previous thirty years of federal court development 
of the terms “access . . . without authorization,” “exceed[ing] 
authorized access,” “agent,” and “lawful consent” in the federal 
anti-hacking Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”),51 the 
“wiretap” title of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act 
(“ECPA”),52 and the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).53 
Common issues relating to expectations, authorized or proper 
                                                                                                     
 50. See Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Announces Small UAS 
Registration Rule (Dec. 14, 2015), 
http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=19856 (last visited Dec. 16, 
2015) (announcing a web-based aircraft registration process for owners of small 
unmanned aircraft) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 51. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). The 
Administration is currently proposing some modifications. See UPDATED 
ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 
13, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/updated-la
w-enforcement-tools.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 52. Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521 
(2012). 
 53. Stored Communications Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2709 (2012). 
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access by employees to the computer systems of their employers,54 
or visitors to “public” websites with restrictive online terms55 
span the small separation between personal privacy and the 
commercial privacy protected by the DTSA. 
A difference from the current coexistence of UTSA, CFAA, 
ECPA, SCA, and other state law is that while the DTSA retains 
the EEA non-preemption of law, including state law, “for the 
misappropriation of a trade secret,”56 there is nothing said about 
preemption of other law. Thus there is a question of whether the 
DTSA would preempt a breach of contract,57 breach of 
confidentiality action, or the application of a contract to establish 
a duty of confidentiality. 
B. Does DTSA’s Promise of “Employee Mobility” Preempt Non-
Compete Agreements? 
DTSA expressly restricts injunctions at proposed 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1836(b)(3)(i): “provided the order does not prevent a person from 
accepting an offer of employment under conditions that avoid 
actual or threatened misappropriation.”58 The sponsors put on the 
legislative record that the DTSA would not “restrict employee 
mobility” and “states explicitly that a person cannot be prevented 
from accepting an offer of employment because of his or her prior 
exposure to trade secrets.”59 
                                                                                                     
 54. E.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(determining that authorization was not lost by non-work use of employer 
computer system). 
 55. E.g., Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(“Nothing inherent in any of these steps prompts us to infer that access by 
the general public was restricted.”). 
 56. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 3326 & S. 1890, 114th Cong. § 
2(f) (2015); 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2012). 
 57. Cf. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 7(b)(1) (1985), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2015) (providing no effect on “contractual remedies, whether or 
not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 58. H.R. 3326 & S. 1890 § 2(a). 
 59. 161 CONG. REC. S7252 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch). This appears to be a reversal of the declared neutrality of the 2014 
predecessor bill on the “inevitable disclosure doctrine.” H.R. REP. NO. 113-657, at 
12 n.9 (2014). 
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Does this express federal policy preempt an employee non-
compete agreement premised on an employee’s “prior exposure to 
trade secrets,” as many such agreements need to be in order to be 
enforceable?60 Reading the employee mobility proviso literally, 
would it allow an injunction to be written to bar the use of 
specific secrets? If so, may an employee subject to such a non-
compete agreement justified by potential misappropriation of 
trade secrets (or their new employers) file declaratory judgment 
action to void or rewrite the agreement? 
As the use of employee non-compete agreements is wide-
spread, one would expect the employee mobility proviso to be 
removed or rewritten. 
VI. Conclusion 
The DTSA’s federalization of UTSA “misappropriation” likely 
will not alter the current mix of trade secret cases founded in 
broken business deals and exiting employees, but may incentivize 
through the encouragement of private litigation new claims based 
on shared ideas, aerial surveillance, or web monitoring in 
“violation” of terms of service. The EEA definition of “trade 
secrets” adopted by the DTSA is arguably substantially narrower 
than that of the UTSA and may be further established as such 
through civil litigation by defendants with more resources than 
most EEA criminal defendants. Most importantly, while there 
has been no demonstration that differences in UTSA enactment 
or enforcement require different compliance programs that may 
                                                                                                     
 60. Generally under the common law, most states will enforce a restrictive 
covenant if it can demonstrate that the employer, “by means of a reasonably 
tailored restrictive covenant,” protects the employer’s “trade secrets . . . and 
other protectable confidential information.” RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
§ 8.07(a)–(b)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2015). The definition of “trade secrets” is similar 
to that of UTSA § 1(3), with a requirement of “reasonable measures.” Id. 
§ 8.02(b). “Confidential information” that is not “technically” a “trade secret” is 
protectable where the employee “was put on notice of which information the 
employer considered confidential and proprietary,” but does not include 
information that would be considered part of the general experience, knowledge, 
training, and skills that an employee acquires in the course of employment.” Id. 
§ 8.07 cmt. b. A majority of states will rewrite (“blue pencil”) the contract. Id. 
§ 8.08, Reporters’ Notes for cmt. a. But clearly there is difference among the 
states, notably California, which voids restraints on employment. CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 2015). 
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be resolved by DTSA harmonization, the DTSA does not in fact 
harmonize. Instead, the DTSA creates dual private unfair 
competition litigation regimes with different definitions of “trade 
secrets” and limited preemption that likely will affect the scope of 
EEA “trade secrets,” employment law, and possibly online 
privacy. Thus, it would be prudent for Congress to act 
conservatively and rethink the DTSA.   
 
